1- THE COLD WAR: AN ORTHODOX VIEW


An analysis of the origins of the Cold War which leaves out these factors – the intransigence of Leninist ideology, the sinister dynamics of a totalitarian society, and the madness of Stalin – is obviously incomplete. It was these factors which made it hard for the West to accept the thesis that Russia was moved only by a desire to protect its security and would be satisfied by the control of Eastern Europe; it was these factors which charged the debate between universalism and spheres of influence with apocalyptic potentiality.

Leninism and totalitarianism created a structure of thought and behavior which made postwar collaboration between Russia and America … inherently impossible. The Soviet dictatorship of 1945 simply could not have survived such a collaboration. The difference between America and Russia in 1945 was that some Americans fundamentally believed that, over a long run, a *modus vivendi* (accommodation) with Russia was possible; while the Russians, so far as one can tell, believed in no more than a short-run *modus vivendi* with the United States.

Harriman and Kennan, this narrative has made clear, took the lead in warning Washington about the difficulties of short-run dealings with the Soviet Union. But both argued that, if the United States developed a rational policy and stuck to it, there would be, after long and rough passages, the prospect of eventual clearing.

There is no corresponding evidence on the Russian side that anyone seriously sought a *modus vivendi* in these terms. Stalin’s choice was whether his long-term ideological and national interests would be better served by a short-run truce with the West or by an immediate resumption of pressure. In October 1945 Stalin indicated to Harriman at Sochi that he planned to adopt the second course – that the Soviet Union was going isolationist.

If the condition of Eastern Europe made unilateral action seem essential in the interests of Russian security, the condition of Western Europe and the United States offered new temptations for communist expansion. The point of no return came on July 2, 1947, when Molotov, after bringing 89 technical specialists with him to Paris and evincing initial interest in the project for European reconstruction, received the hot flash from the Kremlin, denounced the whole idea, and walked out of the conference. For the next fifteen years the Cold War raged unabated, passing out of historical ambiguity into the realm of good versus evil and breeding on both sides simplifications, stereotypes, and self-serving absolutes, often couched in interchangeable phrases.
I cannot conceal from you the concern with which I view the development of events of mutual interest since our fruitful meeting at Yalta . . . So far there has been a discouraging lack of progress made in the carrying out, which the world expects, of the political decisions which we reached at the Conference, particularly those relating to the Polish question. I am frankly puzzled as to why this should be and must tell you that I do not fully understand in many respects the apparent indifferent attitude of your Government. Having understood each other so well at Yalta I am convinced that the three of us can and will clear away any obstacles which have developed since then. I intend, therefore, in this message to lay before you with complete frankness the problem as I see it . . .

[The] part of our agreements at Yalta which has aroused the greatest popular interest and is the most urgent relates to the Polish question. You are aware of course that the Commission which we set up has made no progress. I feel this is due to the interpretation which your Government is placing upon the Crimean decisions. . . .

In the discussions that have taken place so far your Government appears to take the position that the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity which we agreed should be formed should be little more than a continuation of the present Warsaw Government. I cannot reconcile this either with our agreement or our discussions. While it is true that the Lublin Government is to be reorganized and its members play a prominent role it is to be done in such a fashion as to bring into being a new Government. This point is clearly brought out in several places in the text of the agreement. I must make it quite plain to you that any such solution which would result in a thinly disguised continuance of the present Warsaw regime would be unacceptable and would cause the people of the United States to regard the Yalta agreement as having failed.
3- IRON CURTAIN SPEECH
Winston Churchill delivered at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri on March 5, 1946.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of central and eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in the Soviet sphere and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow. Athens, alone, with its immortal glories, is free to decide its future at an election under British, American, and French observation.

However, in a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist center. Except in the British Commonwealth, and in the United States, where communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization.

On the other hand, I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable, still more that it is imminent. It is because I am so sure that our fortunes are in our own hands and that we hold the power to save the future, that I feel the duty to speak out now that I have an occasion to do so. I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines.

From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for military weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. ...If the western democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, their influence for furthering these principles will be immense and no one is likely to molest them. If, however, they become divided or falter in their duty, and if these all-important years are allowed to slip away, then indeed catastrophe may overwhelm us all.
It must inevitably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the
Soviet regime, and therefore to the interests of the peoples it controls. If the Soviet government occasionally sets
it signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to regarded as a tactical maneuver permissible
in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of caveat emptor. Basically, the
antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the
Kremlin's conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary
suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. These phenomena are there to stay, for the foreseeable
future…

This means we are going to continue for long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with. It does not
mean that they should be considered as embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a given
date. The theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate connotation that there is no
hurry about it. The forces of progress can take their time in preparing the final coup de grâce.

Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a
given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of
world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates
itself to them.

In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet
Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is
important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering
or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." …Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless
and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its
sense of realism.

In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the
western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series
of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy,
but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence.

It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the
Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must
continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the
possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious,
persistent pressure toward the disruption and, weakening of all rival influence and rival power.
5- THE COLD WAR: A REVISIONIST VIEW


Particularly after the atom bomb was created and used, the attitude of the United States left the Soviets with but one real option: either acquiesce in American proposals or be confronted with American power and hostility. It was the decision of the United States to employ its new and awesome power in keeping with the traditional Open Door Policy which crystallized the cold war. . . .

The real issue is rather the far more subtle one of which side committed its power to policies which hardened the natural and inherent tensions and propensities into bitter antagonisms and inflexible positions. Two general attitudes can be adopted in facing that issue. One is to assume, or take for granted, on the basis of emotion and official information, that the answer is obvious: Russia is to blame. That represents the easy, nationalistic solution to all questions about international affairs. That attitude also defines history as a stockpile of facts to be requisitioned on the basis of what is needed to prove a conclusion decided upon in advance . . . In undertaking such self-examination, the first and essential requirement is to acknowledge two primary facts which can never be blinked. *The first is that the United States had from 1944 to at least 1962 a vast preponderance of actual as well as potential power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. . . .*

For power and responsibility go together in a direct and intimate relationship. Unless it tries all the alternatives that offer reasonable probabilities of success, a nation with the great relative supremacy enjoyed by the United States between 1944 and 1962 cannot with any real warrant or meaning claim that it has been *forced* to follow a certain approach or policy. Yet that is the American claim even though it did not explore several such alternatives.

Instead, and this is the second fact that cannot be dodged, the United States used or deployed its preponderance of power wholly within the assumptions and the tradition of the strategy of the Open Door Policy. The United States never formulated and offered the Soviet Union a settlement based on other, less grandiose, terms . . . The popular idea that Soviet leaders emerged from the war ready to do aggressive battle against the United States is simply not borne out by the evidence. . . .
Question: Can it be considered that Mr. Churchill’s speech is prejudicial to the cause of peace and security?

Answer: Yes, unquestionably. As a matter of fact, Mr. Churchill now takes the stand of the warmongers, and in this Mr. Churchill is not alone. He has friends not only in Britain but in the United States of America as well.

A point to be noted is that in this respect Mr. Churchill and his friends bear a striking resemblance to Hitler and his friends. Hitler began his work of unleashing war by proclaiming a race theory, declaring that only German-speaking people constituted a superior nation. Mr. Churchill sets out to unleash war with a race theory, asserting that only English-speaking nations are superior nations, who are called upon to decide the destinies of the entire world. The German race theory led Hitler and his friends to the conclusion that the Germans, as the only superior nation, should rule over other nations. The English race theory leads Mr. Churchill and his friends to the conclusion that the English-speaking nations, as the only superior nations, should rule over the rest of the nations of the world. . . .

As a result of the German invasion the Soviet Union has lost irretrievably in the fighting against the Germans, and also through the German occupation and the deportation of Soviet citizens to German servitude, a total of about seven million people. …Possibly in some quarters an inclination is felt to forget about these colossal sacrifices of the Soviet people which secured the liberation of Europe from the Hitlerite yoke. But the Soviet Union cannot forget about them. And so what can there be surprising about the fact that the Soviet Union, anxious for its future safety, is trying to see to it that governments loyal in their attitude to the Soviet Union should exist in these countries? How can anyone, who has not taken leave of his senses, describe these peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union as expansionist tendencies on the part of our state?
The Paris Peace Conference was discussing a peace treaty for Romania when on 10 October 1946 Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, revealed his opinion of ‘equal opportunity’ or the ‘open world’ economy the United States was striving for.

...place side by side Rumania, enfeebled by the war, or Yugoslavia, ruined by the German and Italian fascists, and the United States of America, whose wealth has grown immensely during the war, and you will clearly see what the implementation of the principle of ‘equal opportunity’ would mean in practice. Imagine, under these circumstances, that in this same Rumania or Yugoslavia, or in some other war weakened state, you have this so-called ‘equal opportunity’ for, let us say, American capital – that is, the opportunity for it to penetrate unhindered into Rumanian industry, or Yugoslav industry and so forth; what, then, will remain of Rumania’s national industry, or of Yugoslavia’s national industry?

It is surely not so difficult to understand that if American capital were given a free hand in the small states ruined and enfeebled by the war, as the advocates of the principle of ‘equal opportunity’ desire, American capital would buy up the local industries, appropriate the more attractive Rumanian, Yugoslav and all other enterprises, and would become the master in these small states. Given such a situation, we would probably live to see the day when in your own country, on switching on the radio, you would be hearing not so much your own language as one American gramophone record after another or some piece or other of British propaganda. The time might come when in your own country, on going to the cinema, you would be seeing American films sold for foreign consumption – and not those of the better quality, but those manufactured in greater quantity, and circulated and imposed abroad by the agents of powerful firms and cinema companies which have grown particularly rich during the war.

Can anyone really fail to see that if, as a result of the application of the principle of so-called ‘equal opportunity’ in small states, unrestricted competition begins between the home products and the products poured out by the factories of the United States or Great Britain, nothing will remain of the sovereignty and independence of these states, especially considering the postwar conditions? Is it not clear that such unrestricted application of the principle of ‘equal opportunity’ in the given conditions would in practice mean the veritable economic enslavement of the small states and their subjugation to the rule and arbitrary will of strong and enriched foreign firms, banks and industrial companies?
The so-called Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan are particularly glaring examples of the manner in which the principles of the United Nations are violated, of the way in which the Organization is ignored.

As the experience of the past few months has shown, the proclamation of this doctrine meant that the United States Government has moved toward a direct renunciation of the principles of international collaboration and concerted action by the great Powers and toward attempts to impose its will on other independent states, while at the same time obviously using the economic resources distributed as relief to individual needy nations as an instrument of political pressure. This is clearly proved by the measures taken by the United States Government with regard to Greece and Turkey which ignore and bypass the United Nations as well as by the measures proposed under the so-called Marshall Plan in Europe. This policy conflicts sharply with the principles expressed by the General Assembly in its resolution of 11 December 1946, which declares that relief supplies to other countries ‘should . . . at no time be used as a political weapon.’

As is now clear, the Marshall Plan constitutes in essence merely a variant of the Truman Doctrine adapted to the conditions of postwar Europe. In bringing forward this plan, the United States Government apparently counted on the cooperation of the Governments of the United Kingdom and France to confront the European countries in need of relief with the necessity of renouncing their inalienable right to dispose of their economic resources and to plan their national economy in their own way. The United States also counted on making all these countries directly dependent on the interests of American monopolies, which are striving to avert the approaching depression by an accelerated export of commodities and capital in Europe. . . .

It is becoming more and more evident to everyone that the implementation of the Marshall Plan will mean placing European countries under the economic and political control of the United States and direct interference by the latter in the internal affairs of those countries.

Moreover, this Plan is an attempt to split Europe into two camps and, with the help of the United Kingdom and France, to complete the formation of a bloc of several European countries hostile to the interests of the democratic countries of Eastern Europe and most particularly to the interests of the Soviet Union.